Babagana Monguno Years As National Security Adviser (July 2015-Date?)
Like I noted earlier, while there have been eight National Security Advisers (NSAs) so far in Nigeria since the position was established. But there is only enough space for me here to address in detail the defining characteristics of the eight years unbroken tenure of Major General Babagana Monguno (rtd) as NSA. Monguno’s tenure needs examination because, first, he is the NSA with the longest unbroken tenure, thus there is the tendency that his tenure could define how the ONSA comes to be seen.
Second, it is the most recent tenure. Third, it is the most controversial NSA tenure. Finally I find it the most outlier in terms of style and personality when compared to all the other previous seven occupants of the office. In judging Monguno’s tenure, I will make comparisons with the tenures of the seven earlier NSAs, and also compare the Monguno tenure with the Scowcroft Model which has been adjudged as the gold standard for the NSA.
PERSONAL STYLE: In terms of personal style, all seven previous NSAs have been without exception persons who kept a low public profile and generally operated off stage. General Aliyu Gusau (who served three administrations in the position) is arguably the most taciturn and self effacing of them all and one could hardly find a picture or video clip of Gusau brief the press as NSA. Ditto for the others and only on one or two occasions, would you find General Owoye Andrew Azazi and Col Sambo Dasuki addressing the press.
This attitude is one of the articles of faith of the Scowcroft Model which advocated the NSA to keep a low public profile and operate generally off stage, behind the scene and shunning publicity. Elevating the NSA to a large public and operational role came with significant costs, and the NSA would be more effective if he operated behind the scenes with Scowcroft remarking that the NSA “should be seen occasionally, heard even less.” In terms of this, all previous NSAs towed the Scowcroft line but the Monguno years saw the emergence of a publicity loving, media craving NSA.
STRATEGIC THINKER VS OPERATOR: In order to be an effective process manager, independent policy adviser, and honest broker, the Scowcroft Model advocates that the NSA must operate at a strategic, not tactical, or operational level. That is to say the NSA must operate at a level above that of the managers of specific sectors of the larger national security community, such as the intelligence community or the Armed Forces. Again while all previous seven NSAs operated at the strategic level, Monguno, more than any other, delved into operational and tactical matters, often coming in conflict with the managers of specific sectors of the larger national security community.
Examples of such involvement include the recent usurpation of the Navy’s Falcon Eye project for maritime security and transferring it to Office of National Security Adviser (ONSA), something which the Navy is seriously but silently grumbling about. There was also the clash with the Inspector General of Police (IGP) over who really should head the 2023 election security committee which led to a vigorous kick back from the Police less than a week before the election. In my opinion, the NSA (apart from keeping himself abreast) has no role in election security which is purely a Police affair. At other times, you find ONSA struggling or competing with military training institutions to host foreign sponsored trainings.
OVER MILITARIZATION OF ONSA: During the Monguno years, more than any other NSA’s tenure, the office experienced the posting of too many military officers and a general over-militarization of the ONSA. It would appear that Monguno does not take into account the hugely increasing scope of national security or that he only feels comfortable working with military men. Such a narrow view of security ignores the new concept of Human Security which goes far beyond military security.
Another negative effect was that Monguno had a penchant of keeping military officers attached to the ONSA for too long sometimes, in excess of 5 years. Purely from a military career point of view, such a prolonged deployment of military officers on non-military duties is inimical to having well rounded military officers with the depth and breadth to lead the Armed Forces.
CONTROVERSIES AND POOR RELATIONSHIPS WITH COLLEAGUES
Many didactic writers on the NSA institution believe that the success of any NSA depends on his acute understanding of his role and ensuring that he enjoyed productive and congenial relationships with important security and intelligence leaders and the Presidential staff. A study of successful NSAs shows that at no point did such successful NSAs try to upstage any of their security, intelligence or Presidency colleagues. NSA must cultivate an amiable relationship with other Presidential aides.
While this may seem like an unnecessary point, it must be remembered that one of the NSA’s main functions is to ensure coordination among all members of the national security community. And this cannot be effectively done without productive relationships. Before Monguno, one can hardly recall any case of public disagreement between any of the previous seven NSAs and another top member of government security, intelligence or presidency. With Monguno such altercations became legion.
As early as July 2016, NSA Babagana Monguno and Department of State Services (DSS) Director-General, Lawal Daura, became locked in a war and a bitter battle for supremacy in what observers said was beginning to have implications on national security. Meanwhile, their principal watched helplessly. The row started when President Muhammadu Buhari directed the NSA to set up a committee to probe military procurement from 2007 to 2015 and Monguno did not include DSS, with the NSA saying he wanted the panel made up of mainly retired military officers and a representative from the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), to be closed-nit “to avoid leakage of confidential information about the committee’s work…” Daura found the remark insulting.
DSS DG also saw NSA hand in a memo dated June 24 ordering DSS operatives to stay away from the interiors of Aso Rock Presidential Villa, and restricting them to the perimeters of the Villa. The relationship between NSA Monguno and DG DSS Daura was further strained following the arrest by DSS of Air Commodore Mohammed Umar (rtd), a member of the Presidential arms panel. Since the security agencies including the DSS are supposed to be coordinated by the NSA and regularly brief him on intelligence gathered, while the fight lasted, DSS stopped briefing the office of the NSA.
NSA MONGUNO vs CoS KYARI: In February 2020, a war of many battles broke out on several fronts between NSA Monguno and late CoS Abba Kyari. Through a leaked memo, Monguno accused the CoS of undue and dangerous interference on matters bordering on national security and warning all Service Chiefs to desist from taking further directives from Mr Kyari. Mr Monguno said Mr Kyari’s directives to Service Chiefs were sometimes issued without the knowledge much less approval of the President, a practice he said has added to the government’s inability to contain insecurity.
The letter added: “Chief of Staff to the President is not a presiding head of security, neither is he sworn to an oath of defending the country. As such, unprofessional practices such as presiding over meetings with Service Chiefs and heads of security organisations as well as Ambassadors and High Commissioners to the exclusion of the NSA and/or supervising Ministers are a violation of the Constitution and directly undermine the authority of Mr President. Such acts and continues meddlesomeness by Chief of Staff have not only ruptured our security and defence efforts, but have slowed down any meaningful gain that Mr President has sought to achieve.”
NSA MONGUNO vs CoS KYARI: Same February 2020, NSA Monguno through a leaked ONSA memo attacked CoS Abba Kyari over Police equipment contract alleging that Abba Kyari overrode a previous directive of the President in a contract to procure equipment for the Police from United Arab Emirates (UAE) with the NSA describing Mr Kyari’s action as “reckless and irresponsible,” warning that it was capable of ridiculing Nigeria as an unserious nation before a reliable international partner.
Monguno warned in the letter that Mr Kyari has been getting away with disregarding Presidential orders to impose his own decisions — even though he had no constitutional power to issue directives on matters bordering on security. The NSA said only himself, as the head of multiple national security panels, and the Defence Minister have constitutional roles to act on security matters.
NSA MONGUNO vs Chief of Army Staff: Same February 2020, in what some newspapers termed “Cutting the NSA to Size.” then Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Tukur Buratai, ordered the immediate withdrawal of top Army officers attached to the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) which included seven Colonels and three Army Generals while the remaining team of 13 Army officers serving at the NSA were notified to report elsewhere on February 10. In total, 23 Army officers serving at the ONSA were posted out in two batches on February 4 and 10, without being replaced. Monguno was away from the country at the time of the postings. But he rejected the entire exercise as a charade upon his return and ordered the personnel to disregard Buratai’s directive and remain in place.
NSA MONGUNO vs Service Chiefs: In March 2021, just after President Buhari had changed his Service Chiefs, Monguno, in a BBCHausa interview, alleged that billions of Naira allocated for purchase of arms under Buhari has been stolen (ostensibly by the Service Chiefs that left office). Monguno said: “It is a fact that money budgeted for that purpose has been misappropriated and no one can account for it.” Monguno, realizing that he had thrown both the President, the Service Chiefs and the whole PMB government under the bus with his outburst, was later to claim that he has been quoted out of context.
During his tenure, Monguno has been the subject of several calls for his removal by various organizations.
NSA MONGUNO vs IGP: The next battle was the NSA against the IGP over the 2023 Elections security committee headed by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) chair with NSA as co-chair, an arrangement which the IGP felt that as the one providing over 80% of the personnel, he should be the co-chair. This led the IGP to suspend the deployment of senior Police officers until he was given his rightful place.
The Duplication of Nigeria’s Maritime Security Project: While the opening of the new Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) and the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) building including the Falcon Eye maritime project drew uninformed effusive acclaim from many quarters (including PMB ), discerning security observers saw it as an unnecessary and wasteful duplication of efforts in maritime security. It should be recalled that on June 10, 2021, President Muhammadu Buhari was in Lagos to commission the Deep Blue Project, a gigantic maritime security project designed by the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) and the Federal Ministry of Transportation.
It is therefore curious and wasteful deception that the NSA dragged the President to inaugurate the Falcon Eye, another maritime security project built by the Office of the National Security Adviser. As a matter of fact, looking at the two projects critically, one cannot see the difference as almost all the ingredients in the Falcon Eye are also contained in the Deep Blue Project. Available literature says the Falcon Eye maritime domain awareness project, domiciled with the Nigerian Navy for providing high-quality real-time intelligence leading to the arrest and prosecution of economic saboteurs, is to be coordinated by ONSA…. another foray of the NSA into operational matters.
From the foregoing, my candid opinion is that Mongunos’ tenure as NSA, when compared with the previous seven NSA’s was an outlier that brought unheard of negative practices and go against the accepted roles of the NSA as espoused by both practice of the previous NSAs and the Scowcroft Model. His tenure is characterized by foray into operational and tactical matters, unnecessary publicity seeking, over militarization of the office and disharmonious relationships with security, intelligence and Presidency colleagues. This means he struggled to assert himself and never truly gained the respect and cooperation of colleagues. It is not all doom and gloom however. To his credit Monguno, has developed several national security policies and strategies: The National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention etc.) Act 2015; the National Cybersecurity Policy and Strategy (NCPS); the Nigerian Computer Emergency Response Team; the National Digital Forensic Laboratory.
As the new administration of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu takes shape and we await the appointment of a new NSA, it is a golden opportunity to rebase and reorganize the ONSA. The next NSA, whenever he is appointed and whoever he is, must to revert to a role very similar to that molded during the Aliyu Gusau, Ismaila Gwarzo, Abdullahi, Sarki Mukhtar, Azazi tenures.
NOTE: The original article was published by Global Upfront Newspaper
